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Abstract
Following Keen and Marchand (1997), the paper analyses the eﬀect of ﬁscal com-
petition on the composition of public spending in a model where capital and skilled
workers are mobile while low skilled workers are immobile. Taxes are levied on capi-
tal and labour. Each group of workers beneﬁts from a diﬀerent kind of public good.
Mobility of skilled workers provides an incentive for jurisdictions to spend ‘too much’
on public goods beneﬁtting the skilled and ‘too little’ on those beneﬁtting low skilled
workers. In the case of capital-skill complementarity, this incentive is strengthened.
The analysis is then extended to allow for mobility of unskilled labour.
JEL classiﬁcation: H77, J24, J61.
Keywords: Tax competition, capital skill complementarity, public spending.
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11. Introduction
The literature on ﬁscal competition, starting with Oates (1972) and the classic pieces by
Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986), has largely focussed on the eﬀects of
capital mobility on the level of public spending. While some authors have shown that tax
competition can be eﬃciency enhancing, most of the literature has tended to argue that
tax and spending levels will be ineﬃciently low due to the ﬁscal externalities of taxing
mobile tax bases (see Wilson, 1999, for a survey).
The problem of the composition of public spending, however, has until recently been
neglected. Keen and Marchand (1997) address this omission by analysing how ﬁscal com-
petition aﬀects the composition of public spending between consumption goods and public
inputs. They ﬁnd that the spending mix will be tilted towards spending on public inputs.
The reason is that this kind of expenditure attracts mobile factors (namely, capital) while
spending on consumption goods does not (since workers are assumed to be immobile).
Hence, in equilibrium, all jurisdictions could be better oﬀ if they coordinated on spending
more on consumption and less on public inputs.1
This paper extends the Keen-Marchand model by introducing skill heterogeneity: There
are high skilled and low skilled workers, each beneﬁtting from diﬀerent publicly provided
goods. For instance, the high skilled may want to visit public theatres and opera houses,
while low skilled workers may beneﬁt more from public housing projects and other progres-
sive social programs. I assume that capital and high skilled labour are complementary and,
in addition, I initially assume that high skilled workers are interregionally mobile while low
skilled workers are not (see, e.g., Mauro and Spilimbergo, 1999, for evidence).
These extensions are relevant for two reasons. First, on the empirical side, neglecting
the interaction between diﬀerent spending categories may blur the mechanisms by which
communities try to attract mobile factors and by which they interact with neighbouring
communities. Second, as far as the modelling side and its policy implications are concerned,
it should be stressed that capital skill complementarity and the greater mobility of skilled
than unskilled workers seem to be well documented.2 Hence, jurisdictions may ﬁnd that
1Matsumoto (2000) shows that overprovision of public inputs does not necessarily hold when labour is
mobile as well.
2See e.g. Griliches (1969), Bergstr¨ om and Panas (1992), and Krusell et al. (2000) for evidence on
capital skill complementarity. For evidence on the mobility of skilled versus unskilled workers, see Mauro
2to attract capital, they also need to attract skilled workers, and to do so they may also
use public goods which diﬀerentially beneﬁt this group of workers. As a concrete example,
when Boeing moved its headquarters from Seattle to Chicago, tax incentives played a major
role. But in order to win the bidding war against competing cities, Chicago also “played
up its cultural institutions and Lake Michigan location—much was made of the fact that
Boeing CEO Phil Condit is a sailor and an opera fan” (Garcia-Mila and McGuire, 2002,
112). Likewise, Denver played its scenic beauty as an incentive. In fact, Denver “City
Councilman Ed Thomas stressed the high quality of life in Denver saying, ‘I don’t know
if we even need to compete on ﬁnancial incentives’ ” (Garcia-Mila and McGuire, 2002,
112). In the end, Chicago may have won because of the best tax incentive package oﬀered
to Boeing, but the cited passages reﬂect the fact that the cities also stressed the role of
amenities and public goods which beneﬁt the company’s workers.
The analysis in this paper is similar to Matsumoto (2000), with the distinction that
in his model, there is no skill heterogeneity and all workers are assumed to be mobile.3
In the present model, given that skilled workers are mobile, regions have an incentive to
overprovide opera houses relative to public housing, since the former attract mobile workers
while the latter does not. Further, if there is capital-skill complementarity, this incentive
is strengthened since spending on operas attracts skilled workers as well as capital, both
of which enlarge the tax base.4 The paper is also related to Huber (1999), who analyses
factor taxation in an optimum tax model with skilled and unskilled labour. However, in
his model the focus is on taxes rather than spending and labour is immobile.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the model. In section 3,
the analysis is extended to mobility of low skilled labour. The last section concludes.
2. Baseline model
2.1. Uncoordinated equilibrium
The model is based on Keen and Marchand (1997), who elaborated on Zodrow and
Mieszkowski (1986). There are N jurisdictions, called regions, each with independent
and Spilimbergo (1999), Hunt (2000) and Giannetti (2001).
3See also Matsumoto (2004), who analyses the provision of two diﬀerent public inputs.
4There is a large body of literature on CSC originating with Griliches (1969).
3taxing and spending power. There are three factors of production: capital k, skilled labour
(or human capital), h, and unskilled labour, l.5 Capital and skilled labour are mobile while
unskilled labour is immobile. Furthermore, the mass of unskilled workers in each jurisdic-
tion is normalised to one, as is the mass of initial skilled workers (before migration) in each
jurisdiction. All jurisdictions are identical and possess one unit of land, which is used for
production. Jurisdictions are small and treat the return to capital as well as the utility
achieved by mobile skilled labour as given. Output is produced with a strictly concave and
linear homogeneous production function, which in intensive form is written y = f(k,h).
Firms maximise proﬁts under perfect competition. The price of output is normalised to
one. Denoting partial derivatives by subscripts, the production function satisﬁes fk,fh >
0;fkk,fhh < 0. The net return to capital will be denoted by r and the after-tax skilled
wage rate by wH. The after-tax unskilled wage rate is wL ≡ f(k,h) − kfk − hfh.
Throughout, the assumption of capital skill complementarity (CSC) will be main-
tained:6
Assumption 1 Capital and skilled labour are (gross) complements in the sense that fkh >
0. Further, at the uncoordinated equilibrium, the high skilled wage exceeds the low skilled
wage: wH > wL.
Furthermore, as in Keen and Marchand (1997), assume:
Assumption 2 The capital to skilled labour ratio, k/h is non-increasing in r, which is
equivalent to hfhh + kfkh ≤ 0, and non-decreasing in wH, which is equivalent to hfkh +
kfkk ≤ 0.
Jurisdictions are assumed to choose ﬁscal policy non-cooperatively. There are two tax
instruments available: a unit tax on capital at rate t, and a tax on labour at rate τ. If
skilled and unskilled labour could be taxed at diﬀerent rates, eﬃciency could be achieved
by taxing only unskilled labour (since labour supply is assumed inelastic). Hence, in line
with the tax competition literature, I assume that both types of labour have to be taxed
5In section 3, land will be introduced as another factor of production.
6Note that the CSC hypothesis strictly speaking holds that the elasticity of substitution between capital
and unskilled labour is higher than that between capital and skilled labour. In the present analysis,
however, only the absolute complementarity between capital and skilled labour matters.
4at the same rate.7 Note also that if it were possible to ﬁnance opera houses with fees, this
would always lead to a ﬁrst best allocation.
Taxes are used to ﬁnance two public goods, one beneﬁtting skilled labour, gH, and one
beneﬁtting unskilled labour, gL. As mentioned in the Introduction, one might think of
theatres or opera houses which primarily beneﬁt the upper classes versus public housing
or social assistance which beneﬁt the poor.8
Each individual is assumed to inelastically supply one unit of labour. An individual in
jurisdiction i receives income from wages and an identical share of the jurisdiction’s capital











i + r¯ ki, (2)
where xK
i is private good consumption of skill type K = H,L in jurisdiction i.





i = tiki + τi(li + hi). (3)
An individual with skill level K = H,L living in jurisdiction i has a quasiconcave
utility function u(xK
i ,gK
i ). Since jurisdictions are small, factor mobility implies that each
jurisdiction treats the net return to capital, r, and the utility of mobile skilled workers, ¯ u,
7Borck (2003) derives the tax structure in a voting model, and shows that even when lump sum taxes
are available, capital may be taxed when the median voter in a jurisdiction has a small capital endowment.
Huber (1999) analyses optimal nonlinear taxation of skilled and unskilled labour. Wilson (1995) analyses
a model with mobile labour, where regions have access to property taxes on capital and land and head
taxes. Hence, the tax structure and spending levels are always eﬃcient in his model and the focus is on
the use of property taxes depending on the existence of scale economies in public good provision.
8Social assistance in the form of a transfer to the individual is, strictly speaking, a perfect substitute
to private consumption whereas in the present analysis publicly provided and private goods are imperfect
substitutes. Letting low skilled utility be u(gL+xL) would, however, not change the results in an important
way.
5as given. Together with proﬁt maximisation by ﬁrms, this implies:
fk(ki,hi) − ti = r for all i (4)
fh(ki,hi) − τi = w
H





i ) = ¯ u for all i. (6)
Equation (4) is the location equilibrium condition for capital, and (6) the corresponding
condition for skilled labour. Note that since skilled labour receives utility from public
goods, this condition implies that the net return to labour is equalised across jurisdictions
only when public goods levels are identical.
Throughout, I will consider a symmetric equilibrium where ki = hi = li = 1 for all
i (hence, jurisdiction speciﬁc subscripts will be dropped). Diﬀerentiation of (4)–(6) gives
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g > 0, (9)
where D ≡ fkkfhh − f2
kh > 0, and uH




With CSC, capital taxes lead to an outﬂow of capital and skilled labour, and the same
is true of labour taxes. Spending on gH causes an inﬂow of skilled labour and (with CSC)
capital. Unskilled wages fall with the capital and labour tax rate and rise with gH.
Government is assumed to maximise an additive social welfare function:
W = u(gL,xL) + u(gH,xH).
Since skilled workers’ utility is given (by (6)), the problem can be reformulated to maximise
the welfare of unskilled workers. Using (2) and (3), the problem can be written as follows:
max
t,τ,gH
u(tk + τ(l + h) − gH,w
L + r¯ k) subject to (4), (5), and (6).
The ﬁrst order conditions for interior solutions are:
u
L
g(k + tkt + τht) − u
L
xk = 0 (10)
u
L
g(tkτ + l + h + τhτ) − u
L
x(h + l) = 0 (11)
u
L




g = 0. (12)























= (1 − tkg − τhg) < 1. (15)
Equations (13) and (14) are the usual Samuelson conditions for the supply of public
goods with distortionary taxes (Atkinson and Stern, 1974): the marginal beneﬁt of the
public good is equated to the marginal cost of funds, and the MCF is equated for the two
distortionary tax sources. With CSC, (13) shows the standard result that public goods are
‘underprovided’ at the margin, in the rough sense that the marginal rate of substitution
between public and private consumption exceeds the marginal cost of public goods.
Equation (15) shows the eﬀect of tax competition on the composition of public goods
in the spirit of Keen and Marchand (1997). In the ﬁrst best optimum, public good pro-
vision should equate the marginal rates of substitution between public and private goods
for skilled and unskilled workers. In the non-cooperative equilibrium, mobility of skilled
labour implies that hg > 0, which leads to ‘overprovision’ of opera houses relative to social
assistance (in the usual loose sense). Intuitively, spending on opera houses attracts mobile
workers, which increases the tax base. Hence, the marginal cost of opera houses to the ju-
risdiction is lower than the marginal cost of social assistance. Second, CSC implies kg > 0,
which further exacerbates this eﬀect: spending on opera houses now attracts mobile work-
ers and physical capital. Third, the unskilled wage rises with gH. As long as uL
x > uH
x
(which holds, e.g., under additive separability of the utility function), the distributional
eﬀect of this will increase social welfare. Hence, there will be ‘too many’ opera houses and
‘too little’ social spending (in the usual rough sense).
2.2. Coordinated policy change
Consider a coordinated change of the spending mix for given tax rates. The following
Proposition shows the eﬀect on total welfare in a jurisdiction.
7Proposition 1 Suppose utility is additively separable. With CSC, starting from an unco-
ordinated symmetric equilibrium, welfare in each jurisdiction would rise with a coordinated
rebalancing of expenditures from public goods beneﬁtting skilled labour to those beneﬁtting
unskilled labour.
Proof. Note that the allocation of capital and skilled labour and therefore also factor prices
will not change, i.e., dki = dhi = 0 and dr = dwH
i = 0 for all i. This implies dxK = 0 for
K = H,L. Starting from the symmetric equilibrium, and using the government budget



















(1 − tkg − τhg)

dgL,
use having been made of (15) and the fact that h = 1 at the symmetric equilibrium. Using
(8) and the fact that with separability wH > wL ⇔ uL
x > uH
x , Assumption 1 then implies
that dW/dgL is positive. 
This result can be understood as a ﬁscal externality of the kind analysed in the ﬁscal
competition literature (e.g., Wildasin, 1989). Providing opera houses leads to an inﬂow
of mobile workers and (because of CSC) also capital into a jurisdiction.9 Each jurisdiction
perceives this factor inﬂow as a beneﬁt, but neglects the negative eﬀect of the factor
outﬂow on the tax bases of other jurisdictions. Spending on goods which beneﬁt immobile
factors produces no such externality, and, hence, at the uncoordinated equilibrium, each
jurisdiction would beneﬁt from rebalancing its spending towards the latter.
3. Mobility of unskilled labour
One obvious criticism of the basic model is that it assumes the unskilled to be immobile.
This assumption might be justiﬁed by appealing to empirical regularities, but it is legit-
imate to ask how low skilled mobility aﬀects the model. In fact, mobility of low skilled
9This argument assumes that workers consume public goods in the jurisdiction where they reside. There
is a literature which studies the ‘exploitation’ of central cities which provide public goods that are used
by residents of the suburbs (Neenan, 1970).
8is a central issue in the alleged ‘race to the bottom’ in welfare policies (e.g., Brueckner,
2000). How then does Proposition 1 stand up when unskilled labour is mobile as well?
This section will analyse that question.
Since from the individual jurisdiction’s viewpoint, mobility of labour means that work-
ers’ utility levels are exogenously given, instead of welfare maximisation I now assume that
jurisdictions maximise land rents (see, e.g., Wilson, 1995; Matsumoto, 2000).10 In order
to do this, land is now introduced into the production function. The production function
is now written f(k,h,l) with land in the background. The assumption of linear homogene-
ity of the production function is now dropped, so that ﬁrm proﬁts can be viewed as land
rents, R = f(k,h,l)−(r+t)k−(wH +τ)h−(wL+τ)l. As in Matsumoto (2000), I assume
that workers are equally endowed with land in all jurisdictions. Let y be the land rent
income of a typical worker. It will also be assumed that since jurisdictions are small, they
treat workers’ land rent income (which comes from land in all the nation’s jurisdictions)
as exogenous.
Mobility of skilled and unskilled labour implies:
u(gH,xH) ≥ ¯ uH (16)
u(gL,xL) ≥ ¯ uL, (17)
where net wages of the skilled and unskilled workers are given by
fh − τ = wH (18)
fl − τ = wL. (19)

















Together with (4), this system of equations determines k,h, and l as functions of t,τ,gH,
10It can be shown, however, that one can analyse the dual problem of maximising the welfare of mobile
workers subject to a constraint on land rents, see Wilson (1995).






































where concavity of f(k,h,l) implies
S ≡
  




   
   
< 0.
I now introduce a diﬀerent version of CSC:
Assumption 3 (i) The production function displays capital-skill complementarity in the
sense that fkh > fkl for h = l. (ii) The unskilled to skilled labour ratio, l/h is non-
increasing in wL, which is equivalent to hfhh + lfhl ≤ 0, and non-decreasing in wH, which
is equivalent to hfhl + lfll ≤ 0.
The typical jurisdiction’s maximisation problem is:
max
t,τ,gH,gL
f(k,h,l) − (r + t)k − (wH + τ)h − (wL + τ)l
s.t. tk + τ(h + l) = gH + gL.
Letting λ be the Lagrangean multiplier, the ﬁrst order conditions can be written
−k + λ(k + tkt + τ(ht + lt)) = 0 (24)
−l − h + λ(tkτ + l + h + τ(lτ + hτ)) = 0 (25)
−hw
H
gH + λ(tkgH + τ(hgH + lgH) − 1) = 0 (26)
−lw
L
gL + λ(tkgL + τ(hgL + lgL) − 1) = 0. (27)








1 − tkgH − τ(hgH + lgH)
1 − tkgL − τ(hgL + lgL)
. (28)
Equations (26) and (27) show that the provision of public spending is capitalised in the
mobile workers’ wages, where the marginal eﬀect on the wage corresponds to the worker’s
10marginal rate of substitution between public and private goods. Moreover, the cost of
providing one unit of a public good is one minus the revenue eﬀect of the respective good.
As long as revenue is more responsive to gH than gL, one would expect there to be relative
overprovision of gH in equilibrium.
To see whether this is indeed the case, consider now the eﬀect of a coordinated rebal-
ancing of expenditure from gH to gL. Since this has no eﬀect on factor allocation, wages
and rents are unaﬀected. Hence, the change of welfare can simply be traced to the change
of workers’ utility due to the change of public good supply.
Proposition 2 Suppose that utility is additively separable and fhh ≥ fll for h = l. Then,
starting from the symmetric non-cooperative equilibrium, a coordinated rebalancing of ex-
penditure from gH to gL raises welfare in every jurisdiction.
Proof. See the Appendix. 
The assumption that fhh ≤ fll at the equilibrium ensures that the revenue eﬀect of gH
is larger than that of gL, given that CSC holds (this can be seen by inspecting (21)–(23)).
If this is true, overprovision of public goods beneﬁtting skilled labour holds even when
unskilled labour is mobile. The intuition is simply that with CSC, the ﬁscal externality
implied by spending on gH is larger, at the margin, than the externality of spending on gL.
Therefore, shifting expenditure from gH to gL can improve welfare.
To sum up, jurisdictions in ﬁscal competition will tend to spend ‘too much’ on opera
houses and other goods beneﬁtting high skilled workers and too little on public housing
or other goods beneﬁtting low skilled under CSC even when the low skilled are mobile as
well. Hence, the hypothesis of the paper is that CSC and diﬀerential mobility of the high
skilled should lead to an overprovision of opera houses.11
4. Conclusion
The paper has examined the composition of public spending in a model of ﬁscal competition
with heterogeneous labour. In particular, when households are mobile and capital and
skilled labour complementary, jurisdictions would beneﬁt by coordinating on spending
11This is not to infer in any way that the author is biased against opera houses...
11more on public goods beneﬁting the low skilled and less on public goods beneﬁting the
high skilled. This distortion of spending can also be shown to exist when both types of
labour are mobile, as long as capital skill complementarity holds.
There is some circumstantial evidence that jurisdictions compete by oﬀering tax incen-
tives to ﬁrms, infrastructure, but also public goods beneﬁting mobile skilled labour. One
question would be whether one can also ﬁnd hard empirical evidence for the distortion
of spending under ﬁscal competition. Another empirical application would be to simu-
late welfare eﬀects of policy coordination based on estimates of substitution elasticities
between factors of production. This would allow to gauge the magnitudes of the welfare
eﬀects analysed in the paper.
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(tA + τB), (30)





kl + fkk(fll − fkk).






x > 1 is A,B > 0. Now, note that as long as
fkh > 0, both A and B are increasing in fkh. Solving gives




B > 0 ⇔ fkh >
q
f2
kl + fkk(fhh − fll). (32)
Assumption 3 implies the inequality in (31) is fulﬁlled as long as fhh ≥ fll. Furthermore,
with fhh ≥ fll, Assumption 3 also implies B > 0. Since separability together with wH > wL
implies uL
x > uH
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